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INTRODUCTION
From 1996 until late 2012, the United States Marshals Service
(USMS) released arrestees’ mug shots in response to requests under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 that came from the jurisdiction of the
Sixth Circuit.2 This policy accommodated the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Department of Justice, which clearly required
the USMS to disclose arrestees’ mug shots in response to FOIA requests.3
However, on December 12, 2012, the USMS General Counsel issued a
memorandum stating that, effective immediately, the USMS would no
longer release federal arrestees’ mug shots in response to FOIA requests
unless doing so would serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, such as
apprehending a fugitive or alerting victims.4 The USMS justified its
decision by relying on two more recent federal appellate court opinions that
exempted mug shots from disclosure under FOIA.5 By implementing this
1

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. II 2007–2009).
See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv., to All U.S.
Marshals et al. 2 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/marshals/foia/policy/booking_photos.pdf.
3
73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996).
4
See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 2–3. The new policy also allows for
disclosure if the USMS Office of the General Counsel determines for itself that a FOIA “requester has
made the requisite showing that the public interest in the requested booking photograph outweighs the
privacy interest at stake.” Id. at 3.
5
See id. (citing World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012);
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1141 (2012)).
2
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new policy, the USMS has taken it upon itself to disregard a federal
appellate court’s decision requiring the disclosure of mug shots.
Law enforcement officers take mug shots, formally known as booking
photographs, after bringing an individual into custody. People curious
about their neighbors’ alleged wrongdoing can visit one of countless
websites that publish these photographs. Mug shots depict people of all
ages, races, socioeconomic groups, and celebrity statuses in one of the most
humiliating moments of their lives.6 Although these websites include
disclaimers reminding viewers that arrestees are innocent until proven
guilty,7 the aura of guilt surrounding these photographs—with their stark,
cinder-block backgrounds and the subjects’ often sullen facial
expressions—is unmistakable.
These websites and news organizations cannot publish mug shots
unless law enforcement agencies release them. Whether and how websites
and news organizations are able to obtain mug shots from state law
enforcement agencies depends on each state’s open records laws.8 But
people charged with federal crimes typically have their mug shots taken by
the USMS, a federal law enforcement agency. Therefore, a federal law—
FOIA—applies to the disclosure of federal mug shots.
FOIA is a federal statute designed to increase government
transparency by giving the public access to information about the
government.9 But FOIA includes several exemptions that allow government
agencies like the USMS to not disclose some information. Two of these
exemptions provide some protection for individuals whose privacy may be
invaded by the release of government records to the public.10 Exemption 6
allows the government to withhold “personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”11 Similarly, Exemption 7(C) allows the
government to withhold “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes” when the disclosure “could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”12 Because both
exemptions relate to personal privacy, courts considering Exemption 7(C)

6

See, e.g., Mugs in the News, CHI. TRIB., http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-mugphotogallery,0,5488047.photogallery (last visited Nov. 26, 2013); Mug Shots, TAMPA BAY TIMES,
http://www.tampabay.com/mugshots (last visited Nov. 26, 2013); Mug Shots, THE SMOKING GUN,
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/mugshots (last visited Nov. 26, 2013); US Counties, MUGSHOTS.COM,
http://www.mugshots.com/US-Counties (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
7
See, e.g., Mugs in the News, supra note 6.
8
See THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, POLICE RECORDS: A REPORTER’S
STATE-BY-STATE ACCESS GUIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS (2008).
9
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
10
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (2006).
11
Id. § 552(b)(6).
12
Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
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have often relied on previous cases involving Exemption 6,13 despite
differences between the two exemptions’ applicability based on type of
requested documents and level of privacy invasion.14
Exemptions 6 and 7(C) create some tension between competing
interests: FOIA’s purpose of increasing government transparency and the
need to protect the personal privacy of individuals in some situations. As a
result of this tension, courts apply a balancing test to determine whether the
FOIA privacy exemptions apply.15 Courts weigh the invasion of an
individual’s privacy against the public interest served by disclosure to
determine whether the FOIA privacy exemptions apply to the requested
information.16
This Note examines the highly contentious application of Exemption
7(C) to federal criminal arrestees’ mug shots. Three federal courts of
appeals have considered this issue using the balancing test.17 The Sixth
Circuit was the first to do so and found in favor of disclosure because it
identified no privacy interest on the part of the arrestees depicted in the
mug shots.18 The next two federal appellate courts to consider the question,
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, created a circuit split by finding in favor
of nondisclosure and exempting arrestees’ mug shots from release under
FOIA.19
Between 1996 and 2012, Exemption 7(C) did not apply when a FOIA
request for a mug shot came from the Sixth Circuit but did apply to
requests originating from all other jurisdictions.20 Because the USMS
policy considered the location of the FOIA requestor and not the location
where law enforcement took the mug shot, FOIA requestors were able to
easily circumvent the policy by making their requests from within the Sixth
Circuit’s jurisdiction. In practice, therefore, no federal arrestees enjoyed
privacy protection for their mug shots despite two federal courts of appeals
finding that their privacy interests were significant enough for Exemption
7(C) to apply. On December 12, 2012, the USMS suddenly changed its
policy and no longer discloses mug shots in response to FOIA requests
unless doing so would serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.21 Now,

13

See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96–97 (6th Cir. 1996).
Compare § 552(b)(6), with § 552(b)(7)(C).
15
See, e.g., Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372–73 (1976).
16
Id.
17
World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 830–32 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 502–04 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141
(2012); Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96–98.
18
Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97.
19
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499, 504.
20
This was the USMS policy until December 12, 2012. See Memorandum from Gerald M.
Auerbach, supra note 2.
21
Id. at 2–3.
14
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this government agency is blatantly ignoring the clear holding of a federal
appellate court.
This Note argues that FOIA Exemption 7(C) should apply to arrestees’
mug shots because their release constitutes a significant invasion of privacy
that outweighs the limited information about the government provided by
disclosure. Part I discusses the legislative history and Supreme Court
interpretations of FOIA. These precedents provide the legal framework for
analyzing the question of mug shot disclosure under Exemption 7(C).
Part II explores the circuit split and analyzes the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits’ applications of the balancing test. Part III examines the privacy
and public interests at stake and concludes that federal mug shots should
not be released in response to FOIA requests under Exemption 7(C).
I.

THE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT

A. FOIA’s Purpose: Increasing Government Transparency
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
regulate administrative agencies.22 APA Section 3, the Public Information
Section, required administrative agencies to publish their rules, opinions,
and orders in the Federal Register.23 This section also required
administrative agencies to make official records “available to persons
properly and directly concerned.”24 But agencies could still withhold
information from the public under the APA for three reasons. First,
information could be withheld if the disclosure involved a “function of the
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest.”25 Second, “any
matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency” need not be
disclosed.26 And third, opinions, orders, and official records could also be
withheld if “required for good cause to be held confidential.”27
According to the House Report on the subject, Congress intended the
Public Information Section to give the public access to the operations and
procedures of administrative agencies.28 But in practice, the statute had the
opposite effect. Rather than using the Public Information Section to provide
information to the public, administrative agencies used it as authority to

22

See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3 (1966).
5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
24
Id. § 1002(c).
25
Id. § 1002.
26
Id.
27
Id. § 1002(b); see also id. § 1002(c) (requiring “matters of official record [to] be made
available . . . except information held confidential for good cause found”).
28
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3 (1966).
23
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withhold information by interpreting the exemptions broadly and invoking
them often.29
In response to agencies’ abuse of the APA’s exemptions, members of
Congress sought to amend the Public Information Section.30 After five
years of proposed legislation, these efforts succeeded when Congress
passed what is now known as the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, to
close the loopholes in the APA’s Public Information Section by
“establish[ing] a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.”31
Congress intended FOIA to transform the APA’s Public Information
Section from a withholding statute to a disclosure statute by replacing
vague, easily abused phrases with workable standards to distinguish
between disclosed and withheld records; by eliminating the requirement
that the person requesting the records be directly concerned; and by
providing a court remedy in the event of the government’s wrongful
nondisclosure.32
The Supreme Court has considered FOIA’s legislative history and
remarked on the Act’s purpose. In the first FOIA case to reach the Supreme
Court, EPA v. Mink,33 the Court recounted FOIA’s legislative history and
determined that FOIA is “broadly conceived . . . to permit access to official
information.”34 Although the 1974 amendments to FOIA superseded Mink’s
interpretation of the scope of appropriate judicial review of Exemption 1,35
this opinion has remained influential on the Supreme Court’s analysis of
FOIA’s purpose.36 In particular, the Mink Court’s qualification of the type
29

See id. at 5–6; S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5 (1965); Daniel Gorham Clement, The Rights of
Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom
of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REV. 587, 596 (1977).
30
These amendment efforts began in earnest during the 85th Congress when Congressman John E.
Moss and Senator Thomas E. Hennings introduced simultaneous bills to revise substantially the Public
Information Section. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3–4. Although the 85th Congress took no action on
these bills, the next three Congresses saw similar bills introduced with a correspondingly similar lack of
final action. Id.
31
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3; Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250. The Act of
July 4, 1966, enacted Senate Bill 1160, which was a modified version of the Moss–Hennings bill first
introduced during the 85th Congress. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3–4.
32
Act of July 4, 1966, § 3(c), (e)–(g), 80 Stat. at 251; S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5–6.
33
410 U.S. 73 (1973), superseded in part by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b)(1) (Supp. V
1971–1976), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 & n.5 (1985).
34
Id. at 79–80 (emphasis added).
35
See Sims, 471 U.S. at 189 & n.5; NLRB. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226
(1978).
36
Eleven FOIA Supreme Court opinions have favorably cited EPA v. Mink for its interpretation of
FOIA’s purpose and legislative history after it was superseded by the 1974 amendments. See Milner v.
Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510
U.S. 487, 494 (1994); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151–52 (1989); U.S. Dep’t
of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151, 153 (1989); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989); FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 23 (1983); FBI v.
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of information—“official”—that Congress intended to be disclosed under
FOIA proved significant in later developments of the law.37
Despite wanting to eliminate agency abuse of loopholes, Congress
recognized the continuing need for some exemptions to disclosure under
FOIA.38 Congress had found that agencies abused the Public Information
Section’s exemptions “to deny legitimate information to the public.”39 But,
as Congress recognized, some legitimate reasons for withholding
information from the public exist, and FOIA delineates those reasons in
nine disclosure exemptions.40 As originally enacted in 1966, only one of
these exemptions, Exemption 6, related to privacy. It allowed the
government to withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.”41 Congress was sensitive to the impact that increased
public access to government records under FOIA could have on an
individual’s privacy. And it sought to strike an appropriate balance between
personal privacy and the overall goal of increased government
transparency.42 By requiring a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy” for Exemption 6 to apply, Congress intended to “provide[] a
proper balance between the protection of an individual’s right of privacy
and the preservation of the public’s right to Government information by
excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the
individual.”43
Since its enactment in 1966, Exemption 6’s text has not changed.44
However, Exemption 7 originally did not mention privacy.45 That changed
eight years later in 1974.
B. Exemption 7: From Prosecution to Privacy
The original language of Exemption 7 excluded from disclosure
“investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982); id. at 636 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455
U.S. 345, 352 & n.7 (1982); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139,
144 (1981); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1980);
Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976).
37
See Mink, 410 U.S. at 80; infra notes 77–79, 110 and accompanying text.
38
See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 8–10 (1965).
39
Id. at 3.
40
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006); S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 8–10.
41
Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(6), 80 Stat. 250, 251. The only other mention of
privacy in FOIA as originally enacted allowed agencies publishing opinions and orders to delete
identifying details “[t]o the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” Id. § 3(b), 80 Stat. at 250.
42
See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 11 (1966).
43
See id.
44
§ 552(b)(6); Act of July 4, 1966, § 3(e)(6), 80 Stat. at 251.
45
Act of July 4, 1966, § 3(e)(7), 80 Stat. at 251.
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extent available by law to a private party.”46 The legislative history
indicates that Congress included Exemption 7 out of concern that
disclosure could hurt government prosecutions47 and to make sure that
parties could not use FOIA to receive advance or expanded discovery.48
Seven years after FOIA’s enactment, Congress expanded disclosure
under FOIA and limited the scope of the exemptions.49 Exemption 7
changed significantly due to an earlier congressional review that found that
agencies were abusing Exemption 7 by comingling exempt and nonexempt
documents and then claiming the entire file as exempt.50 Additionally,
courts were interpreting it as a nearly blanket exemption for all law
enforcement files.51
To rectify these problems, Congress replaced the word “files” with
“records”52 and rewrote Exemption 7 to allow the government to withhold
investigatory records only when one of six specified situations applied.53
Among these is Exemption 7(C), which allows the government to withhold
“investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would . . . constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”54
Although the overall goal of the Exemption 7 changes was to narrow
its scope, Exemption 7(C) provided more privacy protection than FOIA’s
other privacy exemption. Unlike Exemption 6, which required “a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”55 for nondisclosure,
Exemption 7(C) only required “an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.”56 Without the word “clearly,” Exemption 7(C) is more protective
46

Id.
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965).
48
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 11.
49
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563–64.
50
See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 7, 84 (1972); 120 CONG. REC. 36,629 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Erlenborn).
51
120 CONG. REC. 34,162 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
52
The House Committee on Government Operations proposed this language change after
conducting extensive hearings in 1971 and 1972 to evaluate how FOIA was working. See H.R. REP. NO.
92-1419, at 7, 84. The House Committee concluded that agencies were abusing the exemptions in the
1966 FOIA, id. at 84, much like agencies had abused the APA’s Public Information Section, which
FOIA sought to amend. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
53
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563.
54
Id. The other five situations that justified withholding investigatory records were when:
[P]roduction of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, . . . (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and . . . confidential information furnished only by the confidential source,
(E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of
law enforcement personnel.
Id. § 2(b), 80 Stat. at 1563–64.
55
Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(6), 80 Stat. 250, 251.
56
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563.
47

350

108:343 (2014)

Mug Shot Disclosure

of privacy interests than Exemption 6 by establishing a lower bar for
nondisclosure.57
In 1986, Congress again amended Exemption 7 and provided greater
privacy protection.58 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986
expanded Exemption 7(C) from “would . . . constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy”59 to “could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”60 The decision to
relax the necessary level of privacy interest for nondisclosure from
“would” to “could” was deliberate and the subject of debate.61 By changing
the language of Exemption 7(C), Congress “broaden[ed] the reach of this
exemption.”62
Although Congress has amended FOIA four times since 1986,63
Exemption 7(C)’s language as amended in 1986 is the same language that
exists in the statute today.64
57

120 CONG. REC. 36,878 (1974) (statement of Sen. Byrd); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989) (“Exemption 7(C)’s privacy
language is broader than the comparable language in Exemption 6 . . . . [W]hereas Exemption 6 requires
that the invasion of privacy be ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the adverb ‘clearly’ is omitted from Exemption
7(C). This omission is the product of a 1974 amendment adopted in response to concerns expressed by
the President.”).
58
Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 320748 to -49.
59
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563.
60
Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48.
61
In 1981, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution conducted extensive hearings on FOIA.
See Freedom of Information Act, Volume 1: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S. 1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982). Two
Congresses later, the FOIA amendments proposed after the 1981 hearings and then modified by the
next Congress were adopted. See S. REP. NO. 98-221, at 6 (1983); 132 CONG. REC. 27,189 (1986).
Members of the House wanted to substitute “could reasonably be expected to” in Exemption 7(C) with
the word “would” to match the privacy standard in Exemption 6. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,620 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Kindness). But members of the Senate insisted on the language “could reasonably be
expected to” as identical to the earlier Senate-passed bill. See id. at 31,423 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
The House accepted the Senate’s preferred language without further debate. See id. at 32,728, 32,743;
see also Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 (adopting the
“could reasonably be expected to” language in Exemption 7(C)).
62
132 CONG. REC. 31,424 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at
756 (footnote omitted) (“[W]hereas Exemption 6 refers to disclosures that ‘would constitute’ an
invasion of privacy, Exemption 7(C) encompasses any disclosure that ‘could reasonably be expected to
constitute’ such an invasion. This difference is . . . the product of a specific amendment. Thus, the
standard for evaluating a threatened invasion of privacy interests resulting from the disclosure of
records compiled for law enforcement purposes [under Exemption 7(C)] is somewhat broader than the
standard applicable to personnel, medical, and similar files [under Exemption 6].”).
63
See OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 564, 123 Stat. 2142, 2184 (amending
Exemption 3, which governs nondisclosure of information when so specified by statute); Openness
Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 12, 121 Stat.
2524, 2530–31 (requiring agencies to inform the person making the FOIA request of the amount of
information deleted “and the exemption under which the deletion is made”); Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2383, 2390–91 (2002) (adding an
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C. FOIA Privacy Cases in the Supreme Court
Since Congress enacted FOIA in 1966, the Supreme Court has decided
nine FOIA privacy cases arising under either Exemption 6 or
Exemption 7(C).65 Although Exemptions 6 and 7(C) are distinct
exemptions, they both protect privacy,66 and the Court when analyzing
information withheld under one exemption has looked to previous cases
decided under the other.67 This Section discusses the doctrinal
developments of the four Supreme Court cases that are relevant to the mugshot-disclosure question.68
exemption for disclosure by intelligence agencies to foreign governments); Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (expanding the
definition of “record” to include information in an electronic format).
64
Compare Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 to -49, with
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006).
65
FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (Exemption 7(C)); Nat’l Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (Exemption 7(C)); Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S.
355 (1997) (per curiam) (Exemption 6); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487
(1994) (Exemption 6); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991) (Exemption 6); Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (Exemption 7(C)); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982) (Exemption 7(C));
U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) (Exemption 6); Dep’t of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (Exemption 6).
66
Besides Exemptions 6 and 7(C), only one other FOIA provision mentions privacy. Section
552(a)(2)(E) permits “an agency [to] delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an
opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, staff manual, instruction, or copies of records” “[t]o the
extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
67
See, e.g., Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 495–96 (an Exemption 6 case relying on
Exemption 7(C) case Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767–68 (an
Exemption 7(C) case discussing Exemption 6 case Rose, 425 U.S. 352).
68
This Note does not discuss Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. at 598, 602, or Abramson, 456 U.S. at
623, 631–32, because those cases only analyze the threshold requirements of Exemptions 6 and 7,
respectively. In the context of mug shots, the government easily satisfies Exemption 7’s threshold
requirement that the requested information was “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” § 552(b)(7);
see, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme
Court’s less than 400-word opinion in Bibles, 519 U.S. 355, did not add significantly to the
developments of FOIA privacy jurisprudence. The Court simply reaffirmed two key doctrinal principles
asserted clearly in earlier precedents and remanded the case for the appellate court to properly apply
these principles. See id. at 355–56. The two most recent Supreme Court FOIA privacy cases, AT & T
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, and Favish, 541 U.S. 157, do not contribute much to the mug-shot-disclosure
question. In relation to the circuit split on the disclosure of mug shots, the Supreme Court decided these
cases after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Detroit Free Press and before the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits’ decisions. But neither the Tenth nor Eleventh Circuit mentioned AT & T Inc. or Favish in their
opinions. See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
In AT & T Inc., the Supreme Court held that the phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) does not
cover corporations. See 131 S. Ct. at 1184–85. Because mug shots involve the privacy interest of
individuals and not corporations, the AT & T Inc. decision does not apply. In Favish, the Court held for
the first time that FOIA’s “personal privacy” includes the privacy interests of family members. See
Favish, 541 U.S. at 165; see also Martin E. Halstuk, When Is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted
Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s “Sufficient Reason” and “Presumption of
Legitimacy” Standards, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 363 (2005) (footnote omitted) (“In so
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1. Narrow Construction and the Balancing Test.—In Department of
the Air Force v. Rose,69 the Supreme Court made two important
contributions to the interpretation of FOIA’s privacy exemptions. First,
Rose explained that courts should narrowly construe those exemptions.70
Second, Rose set forth the balancing test for disclosures involving privacy
interests.71 Rose is also significant because it is the only one of the first six
FOIA privacy cases in which the Supreme Court appeared to favor
disclosure over privacy.72
In Rose, editors of the New York University Law Review sought
summaries of U.S. Air Force Academy honor and ethics disciplinary
hearings to conduct a study on the disciplinary systems of military service
academies.73 Even with the cadets’ names and other identifying information
deleted, the Air Force Academy denied the request, claiming that
Exemption 6 justified nondisclosure.74 FOIA places the burden of proof on
the agency to justify its use of an exemption.75
Before analyzing the specific application of the exemption, the Court
discussed the general framework for approaching all FOIA requests.76
Relying in part on its first FOIA decision in EPA v. Mink, which detailed
FOIA’s legislative history,77 the Court found that the congressional purpose
ruling, the [Favish] Court settled the question of family-privacy rights under the FOIA—an issue that
lower courts have grappled with for more than a quarter-century.”). The privacy interest of family
members might be relevant to the mug-shot-disclosure question, but neither circuit court that had the
benefit of this additional Supreme Court FOIA privacy decision included that argument. See World
Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d 825; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d 497.
69
425 U.S. 352.
70
Id. at 361.
71
Id. at 372.
72
See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966–2006: A
Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the
Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 541 n.184 (2006).
73
Rose, 425 U.S. at 354–55.
74
Id. at 355 & n.2. The Supreme Court also considered whether Exemption 2 supported the Air
Force Academy’s decision to withhold the summaries. See id. at 362. Exemption 2 applies to
“matters . . . related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” Id. at 357
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970)). The Supreme Court rejected this claim because Exemption 2
does not apply when there is “a genuine and significant public interest” in disclosure. Id. at 369. The
public has a significant interest in discipline at the Air Force Academy because of the necessity of
proper discipline in an effective military. See id. at 367–68.
75
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (“[T]he [district] court shall determine the matter de novo, and
may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any
part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.”). A court might find that the government has waived
exemptions not timely raised. For example, the Supreme Court acknowledged a district court’s finding
that the Government had waived additional exemptions to justify nondisclosure when it only invoked
those exemptions after the court denied its initial exemption claim. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502
U.S. 164, 171 (1991). However, the Court did not grant certiorari on that question. Id. at 172.
76
Rose, 425 U.S. at 360–61.
77
See id.; supra Part I.A.
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behind FOIA was to establish a basic policy of agency disclosure.78 Based
on that purpose, courts should narrowly construe all exemptions.79
Relying heavily on FOIA’s legislative history, the Court found that
Exemption 6 “require[s] a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy
against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information
Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’”80 Although the
Supreme Court itself did not apply this balancing test to the Academy’s
summaries,81 the Court implied that disclosure would likely be appropriate.
First, the Court noted that withholding information under Exemption 6
requires a privacy invasion that was “clearly unwarranted,” which is a
heavier burden than the requirement of Exemption 7.82 Second, the Court
found that the Air Force Academy’s policy of keeping most of the cadets’
identities confidential when it posted the summaries on Academy bulletin
boards discounted the probability that disclosure of the redacted summaries
would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.83
The Court was sympathetic to the privacy risk that disclosure created
for the former cadets, especially those who continued working in the
military,84 and agreed with the description that the court of appeals gave of
the privacy values at stake: “identification of disciplined cadets—a possible
consequence of even anonymous disclosure—could expose the formerly
accused men to lifelong embarrassment, perhaps disgrace, as well as
practical disabilities, such as loss of employment or friends.”85 But the
Court noted that Exemption 6 did not require a guarantee against invasion
of personal privacy through the disclosure of information, and that
redaction has been relied on in other contexts to protect privacy.86 With the
identifying information deleted, the Court strongly indicated that the
summaries should be disclosed.87
78

Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
Id.
80
Id. at 372 (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974), aff’d, 425
U.S. 352).
81
Instead, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’s order to have the district court review the
summaries in camera to determine if redacting the cadets’ names and identifying information would
sufficiently protect their privacy. See id. at 381.
82
See id. at 378–79, 378 n.16.
83
Id. at 380. It was the practice of the Air Force Academy to post the summaries on forty bulletin
boards around the Academy and disseminate them to faculty and administration officials, id. at 359, but
to not include names except in cases where the cadet was found guilty, id. at 377. Despite this previous
limited disclosure of the summaries, Chief Justice Burger in dissent argued that the majority’s decision
was unnecessarily complicated because he thought it “quite clear . . . that the disclosure of the material
at issue here constitutes [a clearly unwarranted] invasion.” Id. at 382–83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 381 (majority opinion).
85
Id. at 377 (quoting Rose, 495 F.2d at 267).
86
Id. at 381–82.
87
The Court found that Exemption 6’s limited protection “was directed at threats to privacy
interests more palpable than mere possibilities,” id. at 380 n.19, and “does not protect [from] disclosure
79
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In Rose, the Supreme Court established that Exemption 6 requires
courts to conduct a balancing test by weighing the invasion of personal
privacy against the public interest in disclosure to determine whether that
invasion is clearly unwarranted. Thirteen years later, the Court used a
similar balancing test for Exemption 7(C).
2. Personal Privacy and FOIA’s Central Purpose.—The Supreme
Court in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press squarely addressed for the first time the meaning of the phrase
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C).88 Using the
balancing test as articulated in Rose, the Court found that Exemption 7(C)
applied to all requests for the FBI’s compilations of criminal records
known as “rap sheets.”89
To reach this conclusion, the Court compared the privacy language in
Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C).90 As explained above,91 two differences
made Exemption 7(C)’s privacy protection broader than Exemption 6’s
protection.92 First, Congress deliberately omitted “clearly” from
Second,
Congress
intentionally
amended
Exemption 7(C).93
Exemption 7(C) to ease the burden of demonstrating a sufficient privacy
interest by changing “would constitute,” as used in Exemption 6, to “could
reasonably be expected to constitute.”94
The particular FOIA request in Reporters Committee involved
journalists seeking the rap sheet for Charles Medico, whose family
company had been linked to organized crime and a corrupt congressman.95
The FBI generally kept rap sheets confidential and typically only released
copies to the media when trying to catch wanted fugitives or to the
subject.96 The Court noted that information in rap sheets is mostly a matter

every incidental invasion of privacy,” id. at 382. That the Court’s decision points toward disclosure is
also supported by the dissenting opinion, which characterized the Court’s decision as “blandly
ignor[ing] and thereby frustrat[ing] the congressional intent by refusing to weigh, realistically, the grave
consequences implicit in release of this particular information, in any form, against the relatively
inconsequential claim of ‘need’ for the material alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 383 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
88
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
89
Id. at 751, 780. This adoption of a bright-line rule caused the only split in what otherwise would
have been a unanimous opinion. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the
judgment because he disagreed with the majority’s categorical rule despite agreeing with the majority’s
outcome in this particular case. Id. at 780 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
90
Id. at 756 (majority opinion).
91
See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
92
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 757.
96
Id. at 752.
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of public record in court documents.97 In only three states were the
compilations of the scattered public records made available to the public.98
The Court held that Medico’s privacy interest was sufficient to warrant
nondisclosure under Exemption 7(C).99 In analyzing the privacy interest at
stake, the Court rejected the FOIA requestors’ “cramped notion of personal
privacy”: the reporters had argued that Medico’s privacy interest
approached zero because the information contained in the rap sheets had
previously been disclosed to the public.100 The Court found it significant
that it would take considerable effort to locate criminal history information
from nationwide public records in court files or newspaper archives.101
The Court also considered the possibility that disclosure would
compromise the subjects’ privacy interest in being forgotten.102 In
discussing this aspect of privacy, the Court relied on Rose, where the cadets
had “a privacy interest in past discipline that was once public but may have
been ‘wholly forgotten.’”103 Likewise, individuals generally have a privacy
interest in their criminal histories that may have been forgotten.104 The
Court also found that technology made this privacy concern greater: “The
privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial” and “affected by the fact that
in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that
would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person attains
age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.”105 Because the rap sheets
compiled obscure or scattered, albeit public, information and disclosure
could cause long-forgotten crimes to resurface, the Court found that
disclosure implicated a substantial privacy interest within the meaning of
Exemption 7(C).106
Because Exemption 7(C) only applies to disclosures that would
constitute an “unwarranted” privacy invasion, the Court next discussed
what factors would warrant an invasion of privacy.107 The identity of the
FOIA requestor is not a factor.108 Instead, the answer depends “on the
nature of the requested document and its relationship to the basic purpose
of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of

97

Id. at 753–54, 764.
Id.
99
See id. at 771, 775.
100
Id. at 762–63.
101
Id. at 764.
102
Id. at 769.
103
Id. (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976)).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 771.
106
Id. at 764, 769, 771.
107
Id. at 771.
108
Id.
98
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public scrutiny.”109 Referring to EPA v. Mink, the Court noted that “[i]n our
leading case on the FOIA, we declared that the Act was designed to create
a broad right of access to ‘official information.’”110 To warrant an invasion
of privacy, the disclosure of the requested document must inform citizens
about “what their government is up to” by “shed[ding] . . . light on the
conduct of a[] Government agency or official.”111
In cases like Reporters Committee, where private citizens have
requested information about another private citizen, the Court has found
that there is no significant public interest in disclosure.112 The privacy
invasion is “unwarranted” when the request “seeks no ‘official information’
about a Government agency, but merely records that the Government
happens to be storing.”113
In addition to providing the first Supreme Court analysis of the
meaning of “personal privacy” and “unwarranted” in Exemption 7(C),
Reporters Committee articulated the central purpose of FOIA: “to ensure
that the Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public
scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in
the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.”114 This definition is
significant because it means that when courts balance the privacy interest at
stake against the public interest served by disclosure, only those disclosures
that contribute to FOIA’s central purpose can outweigh an invasion of
personal privacy. Five years after Reporters Committee, the Court showed
its firm commitment to the central purpose test.
3.

The Central Purpose Test: Disclosure Must Shed Light on
Government Action.—In the 1994 case of U.S. Department of
Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Supreme Court remained
committed to the doctrine that the public interest side of the balancing test
includes only how the disclosure would shed light on what the
“government is up to.”115 In response to a union’s request for the home
109

Id. at 772 (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
110
Id. (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), superseded in part by statute, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B), (b)(1) (Supp. V 1971–1976), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 & n.5
(1985)).
111
Id. at 773 (quoting Mink, 410 U.S. at 105 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 780.
114
Id. at 774. Justice Blackmun’s concurrence did not criticize the central purpose test. Id. at 780–
81 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). His only complaint was regarding the majority’s use of
a bright-line rule. Id.
115
510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). The Court was
unanimous on the outcome in this case with Justice Souter concurring and Justice Ginsburg concurring
in the judgment. Justice Souter wrote a very brief concurrence to emphasize the limited nature of the
majority’s opinion. Id. at 504 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg found that the majority opinion
correctly applied the Court’s precedent from Reporters Committee but argued that the central purpose
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addresses of federal employees, the Court found essentially no relevant
public interest to weigh against the invasion of privacy.116
Even though Reporters Committee involved Exemption 7(C) and
Federal Labor Relations Authority dealt with Exemption 6, the Court found
Reporters Committee squarely on point.117 The only difference between
Exemptions 6 and 7(C) is “the magnitude of the public interest that is
required to override the respective privacy interests protected by the
exemptions,” but the parameters for identifying the public interest under
either exemption are identical.118 Under Reporters Committee, the public
interest is only relevant when it furthers FOIA’s central purpose to shed
light on government conduct.119 Therefore, the public interest in Federal
Labor Relations Authority was “negligible, at best” because the disclosure
of employees’ addresses would reveal little if anything about the
employer–agencies’ conduct.120
Considering the privacy interest, the Supreme Court noted that even “a
very slight privacy interest” would outweigh “the virtually nonexistent
FOIA-related public interest in disclosure.”121 Following again in Reporters
Committee’s footsteps, the Supreme Court found that the employees had a
“not insubstantial” privacy interest in their home addresses despite public
availability in telephone books.122 Especially because the home has special
privacy protections, employees have at least some privacy interest in their
addresses.123
The Supreme Court in this case also reaffirmed the principle that the
purpose for requesting the information under FOIA is irrelevant.124
Reporters Committee and Federal Labor Relations Authority limited the
public interest side of the balancing test by requiring a connection between
the request’s disclosure and FOIA’s central purpose. Two other doctrines,
partial disclosure and the presumption of legitimacy, also restrict the public
interest side of the balance.

test established in that case does not come from FOIA’s text. Id. at 506–07 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
the judgment).
116
Id. at 497 (majority opinion).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 496 n.6.
119
Id. at 497 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 500.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 501.
124
Id. at 496. Because “all FOIA requesters have an equal, and equally qualified, right to
information,” id. at 499, the consequence of finding in favor of the unions and requiring disclosure
would be that commercial solicitors would have the same access to the employees’ home addresses as
the unions would, id. at 501.
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4. Partial Disclosure and the Presumption of Legitimacy.—In
between Reporters Committee and Federal Labor Relations Authority, the
Supreme Court in 1991 considered a request by Haitian asylum seekers and
their lawyer for the State Department’s records of interviews with Haitians
who had unsuccessfully sought entry to the United States and were forced
to return to their home country.125 The Court’s opinion in U.S. Department
of State v. Ray yielded two significant doctrinal developments. First, it
indicated that the government might be able to tip the FOIA balancing test
in favor of nondisclosure by decreasing the weight of the public interest
through partial disclosure of the requested documents.126 Second, it
expressed for the first time in the FOIA context that government records
and conduct enjoy a presumption of legitimacy.127
In response to a FOIA request, the State Department released redacted
versions of the requested interviews, but the asylum seekers wanted the
interviewees’ names.128 The Court applied the Rose balancing test to
determine whether the privacy interest in the returned Haitians’ names
outweighed the public interest in disclosure.129 Because the State
Department justified its redaction of the names under Exemption 6, it had
to meet the higher burden of a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy,” while the Justice Department in Reporters Committee had only
been required to satisfy Exemption 7(C)’s lower burden of an “unwarranted
invasion.”130
The Supreme Court found a substantial privacy interest because
disclosing the interviewees’ names would link particular individuals to
highly personal details and the individuals could be subject to
embarrassment or retaliatory action if exposed as cooperating with the
State Department.131 Moreover, the State Department had promised the
interviewees confidentiality, and the requestors intended to contact the
interviewees.132
125

U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 166, 168 (1991).
See id. at 178.
127
Id. at 179; Michael Hoefges et al., Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: The “Uses
and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally-Identifiable Information in Government Records,
12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 30 (2003). But see Halstuk, supra note 68, at 397 (arguing that this
presumption of legitimacy is at odds with the very purpose of FOIA as a disclosure statute).
128
Ray, 502 U.S. at 168–69.
129
See id. at 175.
130
See id. at 172 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 756 (1989)).
131
Id. at 175–77.
132
Id. at 177. Justice Scalia would have found it sufficient to protect the information from
disclosure by balancing no public interest served by the requested disclosure with the fact that the
disclosure would reveal “that a particular person had agreed, under a pledge of confidentiality, to report
to a foreign power concerning the conduct of his own government.” Id. at 181 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
126
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The Court identified only one relevant public interest in disclosure:
“knowing whether the State Department has adequately monitored Haiti’s
compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees.”133 However, this
public interest was insufficient to outweigh the individuals’ substantial
privacy interest because the redacted documents already served this interest
and additional information would not shed further light on the
government’s conduct.134 Moreover, the Court found the asserted public
interest of assessing the honesty of the interviews’ content to be unworthy
of any weight absent some evidence to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy for government records and conduct.135 The Court explained the
need for a presumption of legitimacy as follows: “If a totally unsupported
suggestion that the interest in finding out whether Government agents have
been telling the truth justified disclosure of private materials, Government
agencies would have no defense against requests for production of private
information.”136 Finding “not a scintilla of evidence . . . that tends to
impugn the integrity of the reports,” the Court found in favor of
nondisclosure.137
As developed in Ray, the public interest side of the balancing test
suffered two more restrictions: the government can decrease the weight of
the public interest in particular information through partial disclosure, and
the government enjoys a presumption of legitimacy in its records and
conduct. To overcome this presumption of legitimacy, the FOIA requestor
must provide some support for the allegation of government misconduct.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This legislative history and these Supreme Court precedents provide
the following framework to apply to the issue of whether Exemption 7(C)
protects federal arrestees’ mug shots from disclosure under FOIA. First,
this privacy exemption should be narrowly construed.138 Second, whether
an invasion of privacy from a FOIA disclosure is warranted requires a
balancing of the privacy interests at stake against the public interests served
by disclosure.139 Third, previous public disclosure does not mean that the
privacy exemptions do not apply.140 Fourth, the public interest side of this
133

Id. at 178 (majority opinion).
Id. The Supreme Court in Ray was unanimous in its approval of the partial disclosure doctrine,
with Justice Scalia writing in his concurring opinion that the majority found “quite correctly[] that the
public interests here have been ‘adequately served by disclosure of the redacted interview summaries.’”
Id. at 181 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 178 (majority
opinion)).
135
Id. at 179 (majority opinion).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
See supra Part I.C.1.
139
See supra Part I.C.1–2.
140
See supra Part I.C.2.
134
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balancing test includes only those interests that serve FOIA’s central
purpose of informing the public about what the government is up to.141 And
finally, partial disclosure and the presumption of legitimacy of government
records and conduct, if applicable, further diminish the weight of any
public interest served by disclosure.142
The specific issue of whether individuals have a sufficient privacy
interest in their mug shots such that disclosure could reasonably be
expected to constitute an invasion of privacy that outweighs the public
interest served by disclosure is unsettled. In 1996, after the four Supreme
Court FOIA privacy cases discussed in Part I, the Sixth Circuit became the
first federal court of appeals to consider this question.143 Finding no privacy
interest, the court required disclosure of the mug shots.144 Fifteen years
later, the Eleventh Circuit and then the Tenth Circuit disagreed.145 This Part
begins with the factual background of these three cases. Then, it discusses
the balancing test used by each court. Finally, this Part compares the
courts’ discussions of the privacy and public interests at stake and their
conclusions.
A. Factual Background
The three federal appellate court cases that have addressed whether
Exemption 7(C) applies to mug shots all concerned FOIA requests filed by
members of the press.146 The legal status of the mug shot subjects differed,
but all of the arrestees had appeared in court before the FOIA request was
made,147 which arguably diminishes the arrestees’ privacy interest. In the
Sixth Circuit case, the eight mug shot subjects had been indicted and were
awaiting trial.148 Their names had been released to the public, and they had
appeared in court.149 In the Eleventh Circuit case, the mug shot subject was
Luis Giro, the former president of Giro Investments Group, Inc., who had

141

See supra Part I.C.2–3.
See supra Part I.C.4.
143
See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96–97 (6th Cir. 1996).
144
Id. at 97–98 (concluding that “no privacy rights are implicated” by the release of mug shots
depicting defendants involved “in an ongoing criminal proceeding, in which the names of the
defendants have already been divulged and in which the defendants themselves have already appeared
in open court”).
145
World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831–32 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141
(2012).
146
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at
95.
147
See World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499; Detroit Free Press, 73
F.3d at 95.
148
Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95.
149
Id.
142
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appeared in court to plead guilty to securities fraud.150 The mug shot
subjects in the Tenth Circuit case were six pretrial detainees who had been
indicted and arraigned, and were awaiting trial.151
B. The Balancing Test
The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits fashioned slightly different
balancing tests for determining whether Exemption 7(C) applied to the
requested mug shots.152 The Sixth Circuit’s test consisted of two steps: the
information’s disclosure “must reasonably be expected to constitute an
invasion of personal privacy” and “that intrusion into private matters must
be deemed ‘unwarranted’ after balancing the need for protection of private
information against the benefit to be obtained by disclosure of information
concerning the workings of components of our federal government.”153 The
Eleventh Circuit’s test included three steps: “an invasion is unwarranted
where (1) the information sought implicates someone’s personal privacy,
(2) no legitimate public interest outweighs infringing the individual’s
personal privacy interest, and (3) disclosing the information ‘could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.’”154 The Tenth Circuit’s test had two steps: “determine whether
there is a personal privacy interest at stake; and if there is[,] balance the
privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.”155
Despite some differences, the courts’ tests break down into the same
three stages. First, the court identifies the privacy interests at stake. Second,
the court identifies the public interests served by disclosure. And third, the
court employs the balancing test consistently with Supreme Court
precedents by weighing the privacy interests against the public interests to
determine whether the invasion of privacy is unwarranted. If so,
Exemption 7(C) applies and allows the government to withhold the
information.

150

Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499.
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Complaint at 1, World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
No. 09-CV-00574-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. 2011), 2009 WL 8182100.
152
As an initial matter, the courts considered the threshold question of whether the information was
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Exemption 7(C) cannot apply unless that condition is met. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 157 (1989); FBI v.
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982). The FOIA requestors only contested this threshold question in the
Sixth Circuit case, but the court easily resolved it in favor of the government. Detroit Free Press, 73
F.3d at 96. In the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit cases, the FOIA requestors conceded that mug shots were
compiled for law enforcement purposes. World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at
502.
153
Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96 (quoting § 552(b)(7)(C)).
154
Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 502 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)).
155
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827.
151

362

108:343 (2014)

Mug Shot Disclosure

C. The Privacy Interest Implicated by Mug Shot Disclosure
Although the courts used similar approaches, they diverged in their
outcomes. One explanation for the circuit split on mug shot disclosure is
the courts’ differing opinions on the privacy interest at stake. In Detroit
Free Press, the Sixth Circuit did not find any privacy interest in the
requested mug shots. To reach that conclusion, it distinguished two
Supreme Court cases that found a sufficient privacy interest to justify
nondisclosure.156 Unlike the names of the returned Haitians in Ray, which
the Government had not previously disclosed, the Government had released
the names associated with the mug shots, and the arrestees’ faces had been
revealed in public court appearances.157 Unlike the FBI rap sheets in
Reporters Committee, which offered a compilation of information unrelated
to active prosecution, the mug shots were a single piece of information
related to an ongoing prosecution, which “drastically lessened” the need to
shield the individual defendant from public knowledge that he or she was
facing criminal charges.158 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the mug shots’
release would not disclose any “new information that the indictees would
not wish to divulge” because “their visages had already been revealed
during prior judicial appearances.”159 This court appearance provided the
public with access to the indictees’ image. In high profile cases, at least,
this provides the media with an opportunity to photograph the indictee. The
court rejected the Government’s argument that a mug shot “conveys an
extremely unflattering view of the subject, with strong connotations of
guilt” and held that the disclosure of indicted arrestees’ mug shots invaded
no privacy interest when they had previously appeared in court, and
criminal proceedings were ongoing.160
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and
instead found a significant privacy interest in mug shots because what they
depict is unique. In Karantsalis v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Eleventh
Circuit found that mug shots are not like other photographs. Instead, mug
shots are “a vivid symbol of criminal accusation . . . often equated with . . .
guilt” that “captures the subject in [a] vulnerable and embarrassing
moment[].”161 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that mug shots
are not freely available to the public.162 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the arrestee had a continuing privacy interest in

156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96–97.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
Id.
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his mug shot even after he had appeared in open court to plead guilty due to
the mug shot’s unique characteristics.163
The Tenth Circuit in World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Department of
Justice agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s finding of a privacy interest.
Instead of distinguishing Reporters Committee like the Sixth Circuit did,
the Tenth Circuit relied on Reporters Committee as standing for the notion
that the previous public disclosure of the requested information did not bar
the application of Exemption 7(C).164 Finally, the court quoted heavily from
a district court decision, Times Picayune Publishing Corp. v. U.S.
Department of Justice, which had found that Exemption 7(C) applied to
mug shots.165 The Tenth Circuit emphasized the Times Picayune court’s
description of mug shots as “notorious for their visual association of the
person with criminal activity” and the disclosure’s effect of preserving the
mug shot’s impact “for posterity.”166 The Tenth Circuit also noted that it
had found mug shots inadmissible as unduly prejudicial in a different
case.167
The newspaper requesting the mug shots argued that the Tenth Circuit
should consider the practice of most state law enforcement agencies to
make mug shots available to the public as evidence that mug shots are
generally available.168 The Tenth Circuit found this argument unpersuasive,
though, as state practices are irrelevant to USMS practices.169 The
newspaper also argued that the USMS’s practice after Detroit Free Press of
disclosing mug shots in the Sixth Circuit meant that mug shots were
163

See id.
See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2012). The court
also mentioned a Tenth Circuit case in which previous disclosure of autopsy photographs and a video to
a jury in open court also didn’t bar the application of Exemption 7(C). Id. (citing Prison Legal News v.
Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2011)).
165
37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477, 479 (E.D. La. 1999). Decided three years after Detroit Free Press, the
district court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding as contrary to Reporters Committee and the
modification to Exemption 7(C)’s statutory language from “would constitute” to “could reasonably be
expected to constitute,” which had the effect of broadening the scope of the relevant privacy interest. Id.
at 476–77. The FOIA request in the case involved the mug shot of a prominent businessman, Edward J.
DeBartolo, Jr., who owned the San Francisco Forty-Niners. Id. at 473. The USMS took his mug shot
after he entered his guilty plea to the charge of misprision of a felony, which arose from the criminal
investigation of former Louisiana Governor Edwin W. Edwards. Id. at 473–74.
166
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827–28 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477).
167
See id. at 829 (citing United States v. Romero-Rojo, 67 F. App’x 570, 572 (10th Cir. 2003)). So
has the Sixth Circuit. In United States v. Lopez-Medina, the court held that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted two mug shots. 461 F.3d 724, 742 (6th Cir. 2006). The court noted that
“[m]ug shots, in particular, are highly prejudicial, and their visual impact can leave a lasting impression
on a jury.” Id. at 749.
168
See World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829.
169
Id. The Times Picayune court also found state FOIA practices irrelevant to federal FOIA
interpretations: “Obviously, a state court’s interpretation of a state’s FOIA also is irrelevant to the
meaning of the federal statute.” Times Picayune Publ’g Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
164
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generally available.170 The Tenth Circuit found this similarly unpersuasive
because the Sixth Circuit’s decision is not binding in other circuits.171
“Persons arrested on federal charges outside of the Sixth Circuit maintain
some expectation of privacy in their booking photos.”172 However, at the
time of this case, release actually depended on the location of the requestor,
not the location of the arrestee, with the USMS making a special exception
to its policy for requests coming from the Sixth Circuit.173 Today, the
USMS no longer releases any mug shots except when the release would
further a legitimate law enforcement purpose.174 As such, mug shots are not
widely available.
The courts of appeals differed on the privacy interest at stake. The
Sixth Circuit found none.175 After the arrestees appeared in court and law
enforcement released their names, disclosure of mug shots in response to
FOIA requests provided no new information. The Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits, however, found significant privacy interests despite arrestees’
court appearances because of the unique image that mug shots portray.
D. The Public Interest Served by Mug Shot Disclosure
In addition to differing views with respect to the privacy side of the
balancing test, another cause of the circuit split was the courts’ different
takes on the public interest served by disclosure of the mug shots. All three
courts agreed that the Reporters Committee central purpose test applied,
meaning that the only relevant public interests are those that further FOIA’s
purpose.176 But the courts split on whether disclosure of mug shots serves
any relevant public interest.
The Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press considered the public interests
served by disclosure, even though its finding of no privacy interest meant
that Exemption 7(C) could not apply.177 Unlike federal employees’ home
addresses in Federal Labor Relations Authority, which would not shed any
light on government activity, disclosing mug shots would provide
“documentary evidence of the designated responsibilities of an agency of
the federal government.”178 The Sixth Circuit provided two examples of
170

World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829.
Id.
172
Id.
173
See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, supra note 2 (“Until now, the USMS has
employed an exception for FOIA requests originating within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit . . . .”).
174
Id. at 2–3.
175
Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996).
176
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 830; Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504
(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012); Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 98.
177
Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97–98.
178
Id. at 96 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994)).
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how the disclosure of mug shots could serve FOIA’s purpose: (1) by
revealing that the government detained the wrong person and (2) by
revealing the government’s treatment of the arrestee.179 The court
speculated that mug shots would serve both of these purposes much more
effectively than mere words could.180 By way of example, the court
hypothesized that had the video of the Rodney King beating not been made
public, the disclosure of his mug shot showing his severe injuries “would
have alerted the world that the arrestee had been subjected to much more
than a routine traffic stop and that the actions and practices of the arresting
officers should be scrutinized.”181
According to the Eleventh Circuit in Karantsalis, disclosure would
serve no public interest.182 Karantsalis had argued that Giro’s facial
expression would reveal if he had received preferential treatment.183 But the
court rejected this argument by explaining that facial expressions were a
poor proxy for preferential treatment and that the public’s curiosity about
prisoners’ facial expressions does not further FOIA’s central purpose as
stated in Reporters Committee.184
In World Publishing Co., the Tenth Circuit rejected all nine of the
newspaper’s public interest arguments in favor of disclosure, including the
two mentioned approvingly by the Sixth Circuit.185 Like the Eleventh
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit found that disclosure would serve no public
interest related to FOIA’s central purpose of informing citizens about “a
government agency’s adequate performance of its function.”186
179

Id. at 98.
Id.
181
Id.
182
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[T]he
public obtains no discernable interest from viewing the booking photographs, except perhaps the
negligible value of satisfying voyeuristic curiosities.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
183
Id. According to Karantsalis, the smirks and smiles of arrestees Bernie Madoff and Joe Nacchio
in their mug shots showed this preferential treatment. Id.
184
Id.
185
World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831–32 (10th Cir. 2012). The nine
public interests were:
(1) determining the arrest of the correct detainee
(2) detecting favorable or unfavorable or abusive treatment
(3) detecting fair versus disparate treatment
(4) racial, sexual, or ethnic profiling in arrests
(5) the outward appearance of the detainee; whether they may be competent or incompetent or
impaired
(6) a comparison in a detainee’s appearance at arrest and at the time of trial
(7) allowing witnesses to come forward and assist in other arrests and solving crimes
(8) capturing a fugitive
(9) to show whether the indictee took the charges seriously.
Id. at 831.
186
Id.
180
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After identifying the privacy and public interests at stake, the ultimate
balancing for all three courts was easy. In Detroit Free Press, weighing no
privacy interest against at least two public interests meant that
Exemption 7(C) did not apply.187 For the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
weighing substantial privacy interests against no public interest meant that
Exemption 7(C) did apply.188
E. The Consequences of the Circuit Split
Until recently, the effective consequence of the circuit split was that
no federal arrestees’ mug shots were protected from disclosure. As
mentioned in Karantsalis, the split caused the USMS’s disclosure policy
for mug shots to hinge on the jurisdiction of the request’s origin.189 As a
general rule, the USMS did not release mug shots in response to FOIA
requests.190 But if the USMS received a FOIA request from the jurisdiction
of the Sixth Circuit, the USMS followed Detroit Free Press and released
the mug shot.191 Any media outlet could easily exploit this exception by, for
example, setting up a post office box within the Sixth Circuit.192 Once the
USMS had released a mug shot to a FOIA requestor within the Sixth
Circuit, it would then release that mug shot to any FOIA requestor since the
information entered the public domain with the initial release.193
A recent example of this 1996–2012 policy at work is in the case of
Jared Lee Loughner, who attempted to assassinate Congresswoman
Gabrielle Giffords, killing six people, and shooting twelve others on
January 8, 2011, in Tucson, Arizona.194 Loughner’s defense counsel sought
a court order prohibiting the release of his mug shots.195 The Government
responded to this motion by explaining that it agreed that FOIA did not
require disclosure and did not oppose the defendant’s motion, but without a
187

Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97–98 (6th Cir. 1996).
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 831–32; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504.
189
Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501.
190
Id.; Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 14 n.5, Karantsalis v. Dep’t of Justice, 132 S. Ct.
1141 (2012) (No. 11-342) (cert. denied); Emergency Motion to Bar Release of Post-Arrest
Photographic Images of Defendant at 2, United States v. Loughner, No. 11CR00187-LAB (D. Ariz.
Feb. 10, 2011), 2011 WL 479905 (noting that USMS policy “generally prohibits public release of
prisoner mug shots . . . except in the Sixth Circuit” (quoting Exhibit A, Memorandum from Gerald M.
Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv., to All U.S. Marshals et al. (Aug. 22, 2007))).
191
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 190, at 14 n.5; Letter from Lucy A.
Dalglish, Exec. Dir., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, to William E. Bordley, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv. 1 (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with author).
192
See Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501 n.1.
193
Letter from Lucy A. Dalglish to William E. Bordley, supra note 191, at 1–2.
194
See Plea Agreement at 12–13, United States v. Loughner, No. CR 11-187-TUC-LABU (D.
Ariz. Aug. 7, 2012), 2012 WL 3231075.
195
Emergency Motion to Bar Release of Post-Arrest Photographic Images of Defendant, supra
note 190, at 1.
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contrary court order, the USMS “must release the photograph to requesters
within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit pursuant to Detroit Free
Press.”196 The USMS had received eleven FOIA requests for Loughner’s
mug shots, four of which came from within the Sixth Circuit’s
jurisdiction.197 Apparently, the district court denied the defendant’s motion
because the USMS released Loughner’s mug shot on February 22, 2011,
twelve days after his motion to prohibit its release.198 Despite the fact that
Loughner’s arrest and mug shots took place in Arizona within the Ninth
Circuit, where USMS policy was and still is not to disclose mug shots as an
invasion of personal privacy, FOIA requestors were able to circumvent this
policy by simply making their requests from within the Sixth Circuit. Even
though one federal district court and two federal appellate courts have
found that the subjects of mug shots have significant privacy interests at
stake that outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure,199 Loughner and
other arrestees nationwide had effectively no privacy protection for their
mug shots against a determined FOIA requestor.
As of December 12, 2012, however, the USMS abandoned its longstanding policy of adhering to Detroit Free Press within the Sixth
Circuit.200 Now, the USMS will not release any mug shots except for
legitimate law enforcement purposes like apprehending a fugitive.201 The
result is that despite the Sixth Circuit’s decision still being in full force
within its jurisdiction, the USMS has decided to blatantly disregard the
circuit court’s clear holding in its new mug-shot-disclosure policy. An
executive agency has taken it upon itself to resolve the circuit split and
ignore the Sixth Circuit’s holding.
196

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Bar Release of Post-Arrest Photographic
Images of Defendant at 1–2, United States v. Loughner, No. CR 11-0187-TUC-LAB (D. Ariz. Feb. 14,
2011), 2011 WL 827230.
197
Id. at 5.
198
See, e.g., Jacques Billeaud, Jared Loughner to Be Sentenced After Pleading Guilty to Tuscon
Mass Shooting, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 2012, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Latest-News-Wires/2012/1108/Jared-Loughner-to-be-sentenced-after-pleading-guilty-to-Tuscon-massshooting. The district court entered a protective order on March 23, 2011, which “directed the [Pima
County] Sheriff not to release ‘any investigative reports, files or materials relating to the investigation
of this case.’” United States v. Loughner, 807 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (D. Ariz. 2011). The district court
later modified the protective order to give the Sheriff the option of releasing investigative materials that
did “not implicate . . . privacy, fair-trial rights, and publicity concerns.” Id. at 836.
199
See supra notes 165, 188 and accompanying text.
200
Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 2–3.
201
Id. at 1–3. The new policy also allows for disclosure if the USMS Office of the General Counsel
determines for itself that a FOIA “requester has made the requisite showing that the public interest in
the requested booking photograph outweighs the privacy interest at stake.” Id. at 3. It seems unlikely
that the USMS will find a sufficient showing very often. See Letter from Bruce D. Brown, Exec. Dir.,
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice 4–5 (Jan. 30, 2013) (on file with author) (describing “but two examples of what is now the
routine Marshals Service practice of denying any and all FOIA requests for federal booking
photographs”).
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III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The contrary decisions of the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits on whether Exemption 7(C) applies to mug shots cannot be
reconciled. Without a clear answer from the courts, USMS policy on the
disclosure of mug shots is unstable and must either severely undermine the
privacy interest identified by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits or ignore the
holding of the Sixth Circuit.202 This Part analyzes the privacy and public
interests at stake in the disclosure of mug shots and concludes that the Sixth
Circuit should be overruled because arrestees’ privacy interest outweighs
the negligible public interest served by disclosure.
A. Mug Shot Disclosure Implicates a Privacy Interest
Arrestees have a significant privacy interest in their mug shots. Three
factors contribute to this privacy interest: the fact that the photographs
convey a unique, humiliating image; FOIA’s legislative history and
Supreme Court precedents; and technology that gives disclosed mug shots
staying power well beyond the initial news of the subject’s arrest.
1. Uniqueness of Mug Shots.—Mug shots are unique in what they
portray: a particularly embarrassing moment in someone’s life that is
shrouded in an aura of guilt.203 The Sixth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion
that arrestees have no privacy interest in their mug shots, treated mug shots
as just another photograph.204 The court failed to appreciate the uniqueness
of mug shots. As the other federal courts to consider the mug-shotdisclosure question acknowledged, mug shots represent “a vivid symbol of
criminal accusation”205 and “are notorious for their visual association of the
person with criminal activity.”206
FOIA requestors’ and courts’ treatment of mug shots further illustrates
their unique nature. FOIA requestors continue to pursue mug shots even
after the suspect has appeared in court, and the media has other pictures of
the suspect to publish.207 This behavior demonstrates the special nature of a
mug shot because it shows that FOIA requestors themselves do not treat
mug shots as just another photograph.208 Judges, too, recognize that mug
shots are special. As the World Publishing Co. decision noted, some courts
202

See supra Part II.E.
World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827–28 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141
(2012); Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999).
204
See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
mug shot subjects’ “visages had already been revealed during prior judicial appearances”).
205
Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503.
206
World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827–28 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477).
207
See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78.
208
Id.
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have found that the admission of mug shots is unduly prejudicial.209
Because mug shots have unique characteristics, their disclosure invades
arrestees’ privacy.
2.

Legislative History and Precedents Support Finding a Significant
Privacy Interest.—In addition to the uniqueness of mug shots
supporting the conclusion of a significant privacy interest, FOIA’s
legislative history and Supreme Court precedents support that finding.
Although Congress designed FOIA as a disclosure statute rather than a
withholding statute, it always included a caveat related to privacy.210
Moreover, the legislative history indicates that subsequent FOIA
amendments intended to broaden the scope of Exemption 7(C).211
Supreme Court precedents also support the idea that mug shot
disclosure implicates a significant privacy interest. The Court’s FOIA
privacy cases indicate a clear commitment to protecting privacy. In only
one FOIA privacy case did the Supreme Court appear to favor disclosure.212
And that one case involved Exemption 6,213 which sets a higher bar for the
necessary privacy interest than Exemption 7(C) does.214 Despite its
continued commitment to the legislative intent that FOIA exemptions be
narrowly construed,215 the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to
interpret the privacy protections broadly.216 Even the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits, which found a significant privacy interest, did not consider the
aggregate effect of Supreme Court authority from FOIA privacy cases
pointing toward nondisclosure.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has found a sufficient privacy interest
justifying the government’s withholding under the FOIA privacy
exemptions even when the exact same information is already available to
the public through court records or telephone books.217 In contrast, mug
shots do not provide the exact same information that is already available to
the public. The public has access to some of the information disclosed
through a mug shot, such as the arrestee’s name, the fact of arrest, and
209

World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829 (citing United States v. Romero-Rojo, 67 F. App’x 570, 572
(10th Cir. 2003)); see, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 742 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting two mug shots).
210
See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
212
See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381–82 (1976).
213
Id.
214
See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
215
See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011).
216
Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 72, at 514 (arguing that “the Court has tipped the scales
significantly in favor of a broadly construed and vaguely framed right to privacy over the public’s right
of access to government-held information”).
217
See U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994); U.S. Dep’t of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 753 (1989).
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other photographs depicting the subject of the mug shot through court
appearances or, if a celebrity, through other public appearances. But the
precise depiction of the subject in the mug shot is not available to the
public. If the Supreme Court is willing to allow an agency to rely on a
privacy exemption to withhold identical information already available to
the public, the Supreme Court should find a relevant privacy interest in the
different information conveyed in an arrestee’s mug shot. The Sixth
Circuit’s finding of no privacy interest contradicts these precedents.
To distinguish Reporters Committee, the Sixth Circuit drew a
distinction between a single piece of information and the compilation of
information.218 That is, while a mug shot is just one picture, the rap sheets
at issue in Reporters Committee contained lots of information.219 Although
the Supreme Court did consider the quantity of information contained in
the rap sheets important,220 other decisions indicate that whether the
invasion of personal privacy is unwarranted turns more on the nature of the
information—no matter how small—rather than on the quantity of
information revealed about a person. For example, in Federal Labor
Relations Authority, nowhere did the Supreme Court indicate that the
length of the list of government employees’ home addresses was
significant. Instead, the personal nature of the information made the
invasion of privacy unwarranted, despite the fact that most of those
addresses would be available in public telephone books.221 Similarly, in Ray
the Government had already disclosed substantial amounts of information
about the returned Haitian interviewees, but the additional disclosure of one
more piece of information—their names—constituted an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy under the higher “clearly unwarranted”
standard of Exemption 6.222 While the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
discussed the unique characteristics of mug shots, even those courts, like
the Sixth Circuit, did not consider the Supreme Court precedents from
Federal Labor Relations Authority and Ray. The Eleventh Circuit never
discussed Ray,223 and the Tenth Circuit only mentioned Ray in the context
of the public interest.224 Neither court mentioned Federal Labor Relations
Authority at all.

218

See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996).
See id.
220
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 749–50, 764.
221
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 500–01.
222
See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 168–69, 179 (1991).
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See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 500–01, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (discussing only the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in the Ray case on the limited issue of whether
the USMS “conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents” (quoting Ray
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 502 U.S. 164)), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
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World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831 (10th Cir. 2012).
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In another departure from Supreme Court precedents, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized the reasonableness language in Exemption 7(C).225 In doing so,
the Sixth Circuit seems to have restricted the weight of the privacy interest
relevant to its analysis. Its restatement of the balancing test raised the bar
for the privacy interest by requiring that the information’s disclosure “must
reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”226
Instead of the word “reasonably,” the Supreme Court has focused on
interpreting the entire phrase “could reasonably be expected to” as
indicating the legislative intent to relax the necessary privacy interest to
justify withholding information.227 The Sixth Circuit’s use of “must”
suggests a higher burden on the government than the Supreme Court has
used and that the statutory language supports. Although the Sixth Circuit
was correct that the burden is on the government agency to show that the
FOIA exemption applies,228 what the agency must show is that disclosure
“could reasonably be expected to constitute,”229 not that the disclosure
“must reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal
privacy.”230
3. Technology Magnifies the Privacy Interest.—By allowing for the
publication of mug shots on the Internet, technology increases the privacy
interest implicated by the disclosure of mug shots. The Sixth Circuit failed
to consider the impact of technology. Although the Internet’s pervasiveness
is more prominent today than in 1996, the Sixth Circuit had the benefit of
the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Reporters Committee, which made
clear that technology increased the privacy interest at stake by giving
otherwise forgotten information staying power.231 Technology today,
especially with the advent of social media, may have caused some people
to have a lower expectation of privacy.232 But the Supreme Court has
insisted that technology increases the weight of the privacy interest under
FOIA because disclosure would allow long-forgotten information to
resurface.233
This conclusion remains valid with respect to mug shots, even if the
depicted arrestees are users of social media who voluntarily expose a great
225

Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. (first emphasis added).
227
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989).
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See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 755.
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5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96 (emphasis added and omitted).
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See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771.
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See Samuel Mark Borowski et al., Evolving Technology & Privacy Law: Can the Fourth
Amendment Catch Up?, A.B.A. SCITECH LAW., Spring 2012, at 14, 14 (“Some would say [social
media] has eviscerated [our privacy], in part because what one shares openly with the world no longer
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deal of seemingly private information to the public. The Internet gives a
mug shot staying power by providing public access to this humiliating
photograph forever. When mug shots were printed in newspapers and not
plastered on the Internet, the public would only have easy access to the
photograph near the time of the arrest and disclosure. The humiliation for
the subject, then, was limited to a short period of time. After discarding the
newspaper, one would have to mine the archives of a library’s newspaper
collection in order for the mug shot to resurface. Today, however, the
Internet allows any curious person, such as a potential employer reviewing
job applicants, to enter a query into a search engine and instantly retrieve a
mug shot that would have otherwise been forgotten. This easy access
continues even after charges have been dropped, the subject of the
photograph has been acquitted, or the arrestee has been exonerated after a
long struggle to clear his name after a wrongful conviction.
Consider the example of Terrill Swift. He was one of the Englewood
Four, a group of four teenagers who were wrongfully convicted of a rape
and murder in the Englewood neighborhood of Chicago, Illinois.234
Through DNA testing, the four men were exonerated.235 Swift spent fifteen
years in prison for a crime that he did not commit.236 Despite his
exoneration, the public continues to have access to his mug shot through
the Internet.237 Although Swift’s ordeal has been widely publicized and he
chooses to share his story at some public events, he does not have any
choice when it comes to his mug shot, which serves as a painful reminder
of his wrongful arrest and conviction.238 Swift’s story provides one example
of how technology works to magnify the privacy interest at stake in the
disclosure of mug shots.
The interest on the privacy side of the Exemption 7(C) balancing test
is significant. Mug shots portray a unique image of the arrestee. The
uniqueness of the mug shot means that disclosure invades the subject’s
privacy even more than in other FOIA privacy cases that involved previous
disclosure of the exact same information. Moreover, technology increases
the weight of the privacy interest by giving released mug shots staying
power.
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B. Disclosure Serves Some Public Interest
Although the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits reached an appropriate
conclusion with respect to finding a privacy interest at stake in the context
of mug shot disclosure, those courts did not properly consider the public
interest side of the balancing test. Under the central purpose test, which all
three courts used, mug shot disclosure would reveal information about “a
government agency’s adequate performance of its function”239 because the
USMS is a government agency and taking mug shots is one of the USMS
functions when booking its arrestees. However, the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits could have reached the same result under the balancing test even if
they had properly considered the Supreme Court’s FOIA doctrines of
presumption of legitimacy and partial disclosure.
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the public interest served by disclosure
was not essential to its holding because its finding of no privacy interest
meant that Exemption 7(C) did not apply.240 However, the discussion of the
public interest indicates further flaws in the court’s reasoning. The Sixth
Circuit mentioned the central purpose test in its analysis of the public
interest in order to factually distinguish Reporters Committee, where the
Supreme Court found in favor of withholding the information.241 But the
Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that disclosure of mug shots would reveal
information about how the USMS performs its functions failed to mention
the presumption of legitimacy afforded to government conduct.242 The
Eleventh Circuit in Karantsalis and the Tenth Circuit in World Publishing
Co. also did not mention the presumption of legitimacy articulated in Ray.
The Supreme Court made clear in Ray that this presumption of
legitimacy is relevant to the FOIA calculus.243 Although some have
challenged the presumption of legitimacy in FOIA jurisprudence as
circular,244 Ray nevertheless was binding precedent on the federal courts
facing the mug-shot-disclosure question, and those courts should have
considered it.245 The FOIA requestors in Karantsalis tried to argue that
239
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smirks and smiles on the faces of high-profile arrestees would indicate
preferential treatment.246 That allegation would not overcome the
presumption of legitimacy because, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, the
connection between a smirk and favorable treatment is a stretch.247
However, arrestees accusing law enforcement of physically abusing them
could overcome the presumption of legitimacy because bruises or welts on
a suspect’s face could be evidence of mistreatment. Absent this second type
of allegation, proper consideration of the presumption of legitimacy would
diminish the weight given to any public interest that passed the central
purpose test.
Moreover, none of the three circuit courts mentioned Ray’s finding
that partial disclosure could lessen the public interest served by further
disclosure. Applying Ray undermines both of the public interests identified
by the Sixth Circuit. In Detroit Free Press, the government had already
released the name of the arrestee.248 The arrestee’s court appearances also
constituted a “partial disclosure” that lessens the public interest in revealing
the government’s treatment of the arrestee. When an arrestee appears in
court, a judge sees the arrestee and has an opportunity to address any
alleged misconduct. Although this appearance does not occur as close in
time to the arrest as the mug shot, this partial disclosure of the arrestees’
identity through a public court appearance combined with the presumption
of legitimacy causes the balancing test to tip in favor of privacy.
By applying the presumption of legitimacy and partial disclosure
doctrines, the public interest side of the Exemption 7(C) balancing test is
less significant than what the Sixth Circuit found. The public interest is not
zero because mug shots provide some information about a government
agency’s conduct in arresting suspects. But with the significant privacy
interest on the other side of the balance, Exemption 7(C) should apply to
mug shots.
FOIA’s text, legislative history, and purpose support the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the privacy exemptions. While the text does not
explicitly provide for the central purpose test,249 FOIA’s exemptions invite
balancing. The legislative history also reveals that Congress intended for
the privacy exemptions to strike a balance between “protection of an
individual’s private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the
preservation of the public’s right to governmental information.”250 Without
246
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some limits on the public interest side of the balance, a purely speculative
accusation of government wrongdoing could trump legitimate privacy
concerns. Simply because the government happens to have records in its
possession does not mean that the public should have access to those
records when they do not shed light on the government’s action. The
central purpose test is consistent with FOIA’s purpose251 by emphasizing
the public’s right to know about what the government is up to without
allowing the public interest to eliminate the privacy exemptions.252
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated its firm commitment to this test
as the appropriate inquiry for determining the strength and relevance of the
public interest served by disclosure.253
While the decisions in Karantsalis and World Publishing Co. more
faithfully followed FOIA legislative history and Supreme Court precedents
than Detroit Free Press did in analyzing the privacy interest, Detroit Free
Press correctly identified public interests served by disclosure that pass the
central purpose test. However, the presumption of legitimacy and partial
disclosure diminish the weight of these public interests. The presumption of
legitimacy means that courts evaluating FOIA requests for mug shots
should presume that the government’s conduct in arresting the suspects was
legitimate. With partial disclosure, the arrestees’ appearance in court
provides the public with access to some of the information that disclosing a
mug shot would also reveal. Therefore, the public interest side of the
balancing test to evaluate government conduct in arresting suspects is
slight. Although Karantsalis and World Publishing Co. did not consider
these doctrines, they still reached the right result under the balancing test
by finding that the significant privacy interest of arrestees outweighs the
public interest served by the disclosure of mug shots.
CONCLUSION
None of the three federal appellate courts considering the issue of mug
shot disclosure under FOIA was completely correct in its analysis. The
Sixth Circuit failed to find any privacy interest despite Supreme Court
precedents strongly supporting the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ contrary
251

But see Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court
Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983, 991
(2002) (arguing that Reporters Committee “seemingly contravenes the legislative intent of the FOIA by
narrowly defining a disclosable record as only official information that reflects an agency’s
performance and conduct”).
252
See Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The “Central
Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 69–71 (1994).
253
See, e.g., Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004); Bibles v. Or.
Natural Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997) (per curiam); Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S.
at 509 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am mindful, however, that the preservation of
Reporters Committee, unmodified, is the position solidly approved by my colleagues, and I am also
mindful that the pull of precedent is strongest in statutory cases.”).

376

108:343 (2014)

Mug Shot Disclosure

conclusions on that point. But even those courts did not fully consider the
impact of the Supreme Court’s FOIA privacy cases on the issue of mug
shot disclosure. On the public interest side of the balancing test, none of the
courts considered the presumption of legitimacy or partial disclosure
doctrines from Ray, which both cast doubt on public interests that the Sixth
Circuit identified.
While the USMS has recently changed its mind on its mug-shotdisclosure policy, that change is unstable so long as the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Detroit Free Press remains. Short of the Supreme Court
weighing in to settle the issue, the Sixth Circuit should reconsider its
position to make sure that federal mug shot subjects get the privacy
protection under FOIA Exemption 7(C) that they deserve. Ultimately,
privacy should prevail over the public interest when it comes to the
disclosure of mug shots.
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